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Abstract
This paper suggests that area studies and economics have a better chance to be married
successfully if we shift our attention from the exclusive emphasis on economic growth towards
improvements in human development, especially the much broadened version of that concept. 
Different areas are shown to differ substantially in terms of the choices they make among the various
independent dimensions of well-being and the various indicators within each dimension.  The
particular characteristics of each area play an important role in determining the choices societies
make and the extent to which they are constrained by their initial conditions.
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JEL Codes: O1, O2, O5  As is well known, economics was the first of the modern social science 
disciplines to erect a rational choice machinery and try to approach the natural sciences 
by asserting the validity of universal maximizing behavior.  Area studies, on the other 
hand, had their origin in the World War II “Chrysanthemum and the Sword”/“know your 
enemy” era – not immune from U.S. exceptionalism. 
  When considering the relationship between economics and area studies, we also 
need to recognize that economics itself is currently under attack and on the defensive.  
In particular, macro analysis, most relevant to the subject of this Conference, is 
presently out of favor, while micro-econometric analysis is definitely “in” and most of it 
quite unconcerned with the issues before us.  What is generally left of possible 
relevance in macroeconomics are cross-country regressions a la Barro which, in their 
more sophisticated manifestations, include relatively crude institutional and geographic 
variables which, at best, can be called the beginning but not the end of wisdom, i.e., 
something intermediate is needed beyond such regressions and old-fashioned country 
studies. The micro-econometric work currently attracting the attention of much of the 
profession, on the other hand, is generally of excellent quality, quantitatively high tech  
in nature, but if area knowledge comes into play at all it is usually as a source for data 
collection to implement a model the conclusions from which are often quite evident ex 
ante. 
 Cross-country  regressions are mercifully now on the decline but in-depth macro 
country studies relying on area studies information, the natural alternative, have not yet 
really emerged in full force.  While there have been increasing challenges to the 
universalism of the machinery of neoclassical economics, emanating from an enhanced 
interest in institutions, behavioral and experimental economics, much of this remains 
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more convincing theoretical and empirical meat on the bones. It should, therefore, be no 
surprise that there has been increased questioning of the usefulness of economics in 
the public policy arena.   
  The realization that the world is really not all that “flat,” even in this era of 
globalization, is gaining ground.  While other social sciences have traditionally tried to 
imitate the methodology of economics, if with a substantial lag, non-economists, 
especially those in political science, are now ahead of economists in terms of their 
willingness to move into that no-man’s-land between the disciplines and in recognizing 
that cross-area convergence is but a convenient illusion.  Psychology is now being 
applied to help explain differential responses to the current global financial and 
economic crisis.  Can we expect the human development and capabilities approach to 
ride to the rescue, or at least to be helpful? 
  I am assuming that the overall human development (HD) concept is by now well 
known, if not universally acclaimed.  Its basic premise is that economic growth, the 
variable usually deployed as a measure of human progress, is but a necessary means 
to an end, which is captured by the level of human development. Economic theory can 
then be applied to analyze the flow of resources, applied by governments and families, 
from economic growth to human development as well as to the feedback from 
improvements in human development back to economic growth. 
  The relevant measure of human development, of course, should not be restricted 
to the human development index which, as Amartya Sen, one of its parents, has himself 
clearly stated, represents but “rough and ready work” while “the real merit of the human 
development approach lies in the plural attention it brings to bear on developmental 
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functionings which, unlike the case of GDP, will differ across countries and regions.  
Indeed, the need to combine general theories about human welfare with local 
peculiarities, histories and circumstances becomes much clearer when we replace 
economic growth with human development in any societal utility function. 
  In earlier work, in collaboration with Frances Stewart and Emma Samman, we 
extended the concept of human development beyond the Human Development Index by 
encompassing 11 important categories of the “good life” — drawn mainly from the 
philosophical literature, from Aristotle’s Ethics onward
1 – and proposed plausible 
indicators for each category.  By eliminating indicators highly correlated with others in 
the same category and with the HDI itself we were left with 31 independent indicators.   
  It soon became clear to us that countries perform differently with respect to 
different dimensions of “the good life,” and that is where area studies clearly come 
prominently into play.  Areas of the world, indeed individual countries, depending on 
their histories, cultures and resources may, for example, choose to promote 
employment at the expense of social ties or political freedom at the expense of material 
well-being. It is of interest to know the extent to which observed patterns of country 
behavior are a matter of choice, of path dependency, of other constraints, or of history 
and culture. 
  Trying to identify a list of HD dimensions which are universally relevant would 
clearly be a futile pursuit.  Even Sen has consistently refused to present an exhaustive 
list of his capabilities, i.e., those beings and doings that people value.  To illustrate the 
point, one can, for example, identify a number of overlapping “wellness” categories, 
                                            
1 Rawls (1972), Finnis, et al. (1987), Doyal and Gough (1993), Nussbaum (2000), Narayan-Parker (2000) 
and Camfield (2005). 
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employment, security, social relations, empowerment, and political freedom.  As an 
example, picking four such dimensions which are reasonably quantifiable, i.e., under 
five mortality (representing the core HDI), employment, social relations, and political 
freedom, permits us to demonstrate the possible links which can be forged between 
universalist theory and specific area characteristics. 
  Such areas can be classified in the traditional way, i.e., Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Central Asia, by their income level 
as defined by the World Bank, by their conflict or post-conflict characteristic, by whether 
they are land-locked, near the equator, near the water, have oil, etc.  Our aim is to 
explore whether different country types behave differently with respect to various 
categories of “the good life” or whether we can observe convergence. 
  Our approach is as follows:  we classify each region of the world with respect to 
each of our four indicators as medium, high or low relative to the interquartile range for 
that indicator.
2 Our results clearly demonstrate that “all good things don’t always go 
together.”  Given that HD is now made up of many types of capabilities, some aspects 
may be favored in some circumstances and others in other areas and at other historical 
times. About half the entire sample of countries we looked at indeed showed a particular 
deficiency or superiority in one category or another.   
  More generally, alternative patterns of behavior are likely to be dictated by 
country political choices, by current constraints, or indeed by culture and history. Our 
findings suggest that many poor countries are doing badly on the economics and basic 
                                            
2 The full methodology is presented in “Country Patterns of Behavior on Broader Dimensions of Human 
Development” in K. Basu and R. Kanbur (eds.)Arguments For A Better World: Essays In Honor Of 
Amartya Sen, Volume II: Society, Institutions, and Development, Oxford University Press.  
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choice or necessity? There are three possibilities: (a) countries indeed choose to 
enhance social welfare and political freedom at the expense of economic progress and 
basic HD; (b) they choose to enhance social and political dimensions despite 
unavoidably weak economics and basic HD; or (c) what results is not so much societal 
choice but the consequences of various dimensions of the initial conditions.   
  It seems to me that for most cases (a) is unlikely, given the generally expressed 
desire to promote economic growth and basic HD (e.g., to meet the millennium 
development goals) and the fact that there is no obvious major resource cost entailed in 
improving performance on social and political aspects. It seems more likely that a weak 
performance on economic and basic HD is a consequence of deep constraints – 
including weak government capacity, heavy inherited indebtedness and a history of 
violent conflicts – and not, at least at very low income levels, a matter of choice. Given 
the low resource costs of doing well on the social and political dimensions, this is a clear 
choice even in the context of low income economies.  One can, of course, further 
unravel these two categories, social and political, to consider which indicators are likely 
to be chosen and which are likely to be determined.  
  To provide an example, social relations, at least as commonly interpreted and 
measured, are partly a matter of income distribution and partly a matter of having close 
social and family relations and tolerant neighbors. The male suicide rate can be used as 
an indicator to reflect how stressful life is.  The income distribution variable can be 
influenced (if with difficulty) by the government. The other indicators probably can also 
be influenced – for example, if physical security is very low because of poor policing, 
social relations may be worse; and policies towards education, the media and 
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considerable extent, these dimensions are the outcome of underlying social and 
economic forces, not government policy. It seems likely that they (particularly the ones 
involving social relationships) depend in part on the size of the places people live in 
(i.e., being stronger in rural than in urban communities), and on the time people have 
available (i.e., stronger when people are less busy). This suggests that poor countries 
that are socially “high” are in this category mainly because of their superior income 
distribution, while areas that are socially “low,” in contrast, typically have good 
achievements across the social indicators.  
  Putting all this together, it suggests, if somewhat speculatively, that one might 
expect the social side to do better relative to economic aspects at lower levels of 
urbanization and employment – i.e., at lower levels of development. This is broadly what 
we found, and I would argue that it is more a matter of the stage of development and 
less of governments’ or people’s choices. Other policy conclusions follow.  For example, 
the consistently deficient performance across our four categories by countries suffering 
violent conflict indicates, not surprisingly, that overwhelming priority has to be given to 
policies focused on it.   
  The political category, to cite another example, includes collective political 
violence which is sometimes chosen, but can also happen as the result of exogenous 
forces.  It also includes the rule of law indicator, over which governments have some 
influence but which evolves slowly, with inputs from civil society as well as government; 
it moreover includes political and civil liberties which is the one indicator that can be 
said to be chosen, albeit, especially in the case of low income countries, usually under 
the influence of the donor community. Thus, as far as the politics category is concerned, 
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choices they make, not at the expense of doing well elsewhere, but as something they 
can choose without having to sacrifice other aspects.   
  The experience of middle income countries partly supports what has been said 
above and partly indicates the wider range of choices open to middle income countries. 
In the first place, many are socially deficient.  This does suggest that this aspect tends 
to lag as development proceeds: perhaps for the reason given above, i.e., people 
become more urbanized and disconnected and have less time, while government efforts 
that might compensate for this, through policing and redistributive policies, are not 
always in place or effective.  
  The middle income countries also show considerable variation in the political 
category, with two-thirds coming under the “high” and one-third under the “low” label.  
This suggests that countries make different choices in this category – but may, of 
course, also be constrained by history.  The influence of history is most clearly 
demonstrated by the special position of the East European transition countries which 
are categorized as “low” precisely because of their past, yet currently show a rather 
balanced performance. One might expect them to be high on basic HD, with heavy  
emphasis on health and education, but to be politically and possibly economically 
deficient, and socially mixed – good on income distribution and possibly poor on social 
relations.  
  The lack of systematic connections between overall life satisfaction and 
performance on our four selected dimensions of HD could be interpreted in two very 
different ways. One would be to argue, along with Layard (2005), that life satisfaction (or 
“happiness”) should be the overriding single indicator of success and hence the sole 
  9objective of development. The lack of correlation with other measures of performance 
might then be taken as a good reason for adopting this position. Alternatively, one might 
argue, along with Amartya Sen, that development is about expanding choices, which is 
better captured by our four dimensions than by a single somewhat arbitrary measure of 
life satisfaction; moreover, to the extent that life satisfaction indicates that people’s 
expectations adapt to their circumstances, it becomes a poor indicator of area 
performance and a false guide to development.
3  I tend to take that view, but 
perceptions are also important, and a consistently low appreciation of life satisfaction is 
a matter which should concern decision-makers, along with our more objective 
indicators.  
  In conclusion, the several possible patterns of behavior discussed indicate that, 
while some areas may be constrained by history, culture and initial conditions, even 
they also manage to make abundant choices among the different dimensions of well-
being. Even low income countries can do well in all categories. And even high income 
countries can achieve poorly in some. The first gives reason for optimism, the second 
for pessimism.  But, in all cases, in order to get to the “bottom line” on human welfare 
we need a marriage between economic theory extended to human development and a 
deep knowledge of individual areas. 
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